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KNOCK RAIDS BY POLICE
Dimitri Epstein*
INTRODUCTION
Late in the fall of 2006, the city of Atlanta exploded in outrage
when Kathryn Johnston, a ninety-two-year old woman, died in a
shoot-out with a police narcotics team.' The police used a "no-
knock" search warrant to break into Johnston's home unannounced.2
Unfortunately for everyone involved, Ms. Johnston kept an old
revolver for self defense-not a bad strategy in a neighborhood with
a thriving drug trade and where another elderly woman was recently
raped.3 Probably thinking she was being robbed, Johnston managed
to fire once before the police overwhelmed her with a "volley of
thirty-nine" shots, five or six of which proved fatal.4 The raid and its
aftermath appalled the nation, especially when a federal investigation
exposed the lies and corruption leading to the incident. 5 But buried
beneath all the blatant misconduct lies an interesting legal question.
Assuming that the no-knock warrant was valid, did Ms. Johnston
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Georgia State University College of Law. Thanks to Professor Russell
Covey, Mr. Doug Ramseur, and the Law Review editors for their valuable suggestions and insight. Any
deficiencies are the author's own.
1. Steve Visser, Court Focuses on Botched Raid, Death, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 5, 2008, at BI,
available at 2008 WLNR 8347479; see also Patrik Jonsson, After Atlanta Raid Tragedy, New Scrutiny
of Police Tactics: Police Are Reviewing Their Use of "No-Knock" Warrants After an Octogenarian Was
Killed After Officers Burst into Her Home, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Nov. 29, 2006, at 3, available at
2006 WLNR 20583600.
2. Jonsson, supra note 1. A no-knock warrant allows the police to enter a suspect's home without
knocking or otherwise announcing themselves. See discussion infra Part I.A.
3. Brenda Goodman, Police Kill Woman, 92, in Shootout at Her Home, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2006,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/l l/23/us/23atlanta.html.
4. Walter Putnam, Newsmaker-Prison Time for Botched Raid, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL (Tenn.),
May 23, 2008, at A2, available at 2008 WLNR 9804037.
5. Bill Rankin, Plea in Botched Raid Ends Feds' Case, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 31, 2008, at Cl,
available at 2008 WLNR 20770526. The police lied to the judge to obtain a no-knock warrant and then
planted drugs in Johnston's house to justify the raid. Visser, supra note 1; see also Bill Torpy, Senseless
Killing Still Casts Shadow on Police, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 9, 2008, at D3, available at 2008
WLNR 21418601.
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have a right to shoot at the police officers who broke through her
door looking for drugs? Would she have been guilty of murder and
possibly sentenced to death if her shot had actually hit and killed a
police officer?
Although the law is far from clear, in reality "when it's a cop who
gets shot, the private citizen nearly always winds up in jail."6 Take
the story of Cory Maye, for example. Late one night in 2001, Maye
"awoke to a furious pounding on his front door."7 Afraid for his and
his daughter's safety, Maye rushed to the bedroom where his
daughter slept, retrieved a gun he kept for self-defense, and lay down
on the floor hoping the intruders would go away. 8 When a figure
burst through the bedroom door, Maye fired three times out of fright.9
Unfortunately for Maye, the intruders turned out to be police
executing a no-knock warrant, and one of Maye's bullets hit an
officer in the stomach, killing him. 10 Maye was convicted of capital
murder, sentenced to death, and put on death row in a Mississippi
prison. 11
In another case, an Arkansas SWAT team stormed the house of
Tracy Ingle, who, thinking that robbers were invading his home,
waved a non-functioning pistol at the officers. 12 The police responded
with an overwhelming hail of gunfire.1 3 Ingle was shot five times,
with one bullet destroying his femur and leaving his leg "dangling
from his body, connected only by a bloody mess of meat, skin[,] and
6. Statement by Radley Balko quoted by David Koon, Shot in the Dark, ARK. TIMES, Apr. 24,
2008, at 10, available at 2008 WLNR 9499620.
7. Radley Balko, Railroaded onto Death Row?, FoxNEWS.CoM, Feb. 15, 2006, para. 4,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,184992,00.html.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id; see also Radley Balko, Drug War Casualties Left Behind, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 6, 2006,
available at 2006 WLNR 17303525. Cory Maye was taken off death row after being given a hearing on
a post-trial motion, but was re-sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Id.; Region Briefs: Man
Re-Sentenced for Police Killing, SUN HERALD (Biloxi, Miss.), Nov. 4, 2007, at A16, available at 2007
WLNR 21819106. In November 2009, the Mississippi Court of Appeals granted Maye a new trial based
on a change-of-venue error. Maye v. State, No. 2007-KA-02147-COA, 2009 WL 3823287, at *8 (Miss.
Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2009); Retrial Ordered in Officer's Killing, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Nov.
18, 2009, at B 1, available at 2009 WLNR 23254398.
12. See Koon, supra note 6.
13. Id.
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COPS OR ROBBERS?
tendon." 14 Though Ingle did not hurt any of the officers, he was
charged with, among other things, two felony counts of aggravated
assault. 15
The two cases outlined above are not isolated incidents. 16 Radley
Balko, a policy analyst for the Cato Institute, has profiled more than
130 cases of flawed (but not necessarily illegal) police raids that have
resulted in serious humiliation, injury, or death to innocent
bystanders, non-violent offenders, and officers. 17  Moreover,
according to criminologist Peter Kraska, the number of no-knock
raids across the country jumped from 3,000 in 1981 to more than
50,000 in 2006.18 With the deterioration of the "knock-and-
announce" requirement, as described below, such no-knock raids are
bound to increase. 
19
At the same time, many states, including Georgia, have liberalized
their self-defense statutes, providing private citizens with broad
leeway in using deadly force to repel an attack, especially upon their
homes. In 2001, Georgia amended its defense of habitation statute
to allow for broader immunity for someone who uses deadly force
14. Id.
15. Id. In 2009, Ingle was convicted on all counts, including drug charges, and sentenced to eighteen
years in prison. Associated Press, Jury Convicts After No-Knock Police Search, WXVT 15, Apr. 15,
2009, http://www.wxvt.com/Global/story.asp?S=10191222&nav=menu1344_2. For more information
and discussion on topic, see Posting of Tiffney Forrester to Arkansas Blog, NLR Cops See Vindication
Update, http://www.arktimes.com/blogs/arkansasblog/2009/04/nlr-cops-see-vindication.aspx (Apr. 16,
2009); see also Justice for Tracy, http://www.justicefortracy.com (last visited Feb. 6,2010).
16. RADLEY BALKO, OVERKILL: THE RISE OF PARAMILITARY POLICE RAIDS IN AMERICA 43 (Cato
Institute 2006).
17. Id. at 43-82. Specifically, Balko profiles seventy-four cases where the police got the wrong
address, id. at 43-63; fifteen cases where the police got the right address but innocent bystanders were
killed or injured, id. at 63-68; nine cases of death or injury to police officers, id. at 68-71; twenty-three
cases where police used their tactics "unnecessarily and recklessly" on non-violent offenders, id. at 71-
79; and ten cases of similar police recklessness that "defy easy categorization," id at 79-82. For an
interactive map of botched police raids, see Cato Institute, Botched Paramilitary Police Raids: An
Epidemic of "Isolated Incidents," http://www.cato.org/raidmap (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
18. Jonsson, supra note 1; Harry R. Weber, 2 Officers Admit Crimes in Raid-Woman, 92, Slain in
Botched 'No-Knock,' MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL (Tenn.), Apr. 27, 2007, at A7, available at 2007 WLNR
8005661.
19. Jonsson, supra note I; see also discussion supra Part I.A.
20. P. Luevonda Ross, The Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National Rifle Association-
Inspired Statutes: From the Doctrine of Retreat to the Right to Stand Your Ground, 35 S.U. L. REV. 1, 2,
18(2007).
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against a perceived intruder.21 According to Balko, this trend toward
private self-defense is "dangerously at odds with the concept of no-
knock search warrants. ' 22 As Justice Brennan acknowledged in Ker
v. California, police "might be mistaken for prowlers and be shot
down by a fearful householder."
23
Though botched police raids, such as Johnston's, are certainly a
problem, most officers are law-abiding professionals who would do
their best to avoid hurting harmless civilians.24 Yet with the decline
of the knock-and-announce rule, it is easier than ever for police to
legally enter a home unannounced.25 This Note examines whether,
under Georgia's defense of habitation statute, a home dweller can
lawfully shoot at, and possibly kill, police officers executing a legal
no-knock raid. Part I provides a brief overview of the decaying
knock-and-announce doctrine and introduces Georgia's defense of
26habitation statute. Part II first delves into the text of the statute to
determine whether a no-knock entry by police must actually be
unlawful or merely appear to the occupant as unlawful for the
occupant to be justified in responding with deadly force. 27 This
statutory analysis is followed by a discussion of relevant Georgia
case law, both old and new, exploring how courts have dealt with
deadly encounters between citizens and police.28 Finally, Part III
proposes that the defense of habitation statute should be interpreted in
21. Robert Christian Rutlege, Vigilant or Vigilante? Procedure and Rationale for Immunity in
Defense of Habitation and Defense of Property Under the Official Code of Georgia Annotated §§ 16-3-
23, -24, -24.1, and -24.2, 59 MERCER L. REv. 629, 641-42 (2008); Derek E. Empie, Defenses to
Criminal Prosecution: Change Provisions Relating to the Use of Force in the Defense of Habitations or
Residences; Provide for Related Matters, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 25, 25-29 (2001); see also infra Part
II.A.3.
22. Koon, supra note 6; see also G. Todd Butler, Note, Recipe for Disaster: Analyzing the Interplay
Between the Castle Doctrine and the Knock-and-Announce Rule After Hudson v. Michigan, 27 MiSS. C.
L. REv. 435, 451 (2008).
23. BALKO, supra note 16, at 31 (quoting Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 58 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
24. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598-99 (2006) (describing the rise in the professionalism
of police forces).
25. See discussion infra Part I.A.
26. See infra Part 1.
27. See infra Part B.A.
28. See infra Part I.B-C.
[Vol. 26:2
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COPS OR ROBBERS?
favor of the occupant, granting immunity to one who mistakenly, but
reasonably, shoots at police officers during a legal no-knock entry.
29
I. BACKGROUND: THE NEED TO KNOCK AND DEFENSE OF HABITATION
The knock-and-announce requirement, written into the Georgia
Code under section 17-5-27,30 has been significantly watered down,
paving the way for an increase in no-knock entries.31 But Georgia's
defense of habitation statute may still provide plenty of protection to
frightened home dwellers.32
A. The Knock-and-Announce Rule: Fact or Fiction?
The knock-and-announce rule, as the name suggests, requires
officers to knock and announce themselves before breaking into
someone's home to execute a search or arrest warrant.33 It is not
difficult to see why such a requirement makes sense. 34 In Hudson v.
Michigan, Justice Scalia laid out the basic interests protected by the
knock-and-announce rule.35 First and foremost is human life---"an
unannounced entry may provoke violence in supposed self-defense
by the surprised resident." 36  The second interest is to protect
property, such as the door itself, from damage by the police.37 After
29. See infra Part l.
30. The statute provides, in part:
All necessary and reasonable force may be used to effect an entry into any building or
property or part thereof to execute a search warrant if, after verbal notice or an attempt in
good faith to give verbal notice by the officer directed to execute the same of his
authority and purpose ....
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-27 (2008) (emphasis added).
31. BALKO, supra note 16, at 5; see also Mark Josephson, Supreme Court Review, Fourth
Amendment-Must Police Knock and Announce Themselves Before Kicking in the Door of a House?, 86
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1229, 1262-63 (1996). See generally Brian S. Uholik, Comment, Who
Cares If It's Open?: Hudson v. Michigan and the United States Supreme Court's Evisceration of the
Knock and Announce Rule, 112 PENN ST. L. REv. 261,277-79,291 (2007).
32. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-23 (2007); see also discussion infra Part II.A.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-27 (2008).
34. See generally Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593-94 (2006) (describing the reasons behind
the knock-and-announce requirement).
35. Id. at 594 (holding that concealment of incriminating evidence is not an interest protected by the
knock-and-announce requirement).
36. Id.
37. Id.
20101
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all, the police should give residents a chance to comply with the law
and peacefully let the officers inside their homes. 38 Finally, knocking
and announcing protects people's privacy and dignity by allowing
them to collect themselves-by putting on their clothes, for
example-before answering the door.
39
Given the importance of the interests protected by the knock-and-
announce requirement, one should not be surprised that the rule is an
"ancient one,"40 long entrenched in the Anglo-American legal
tradition.4 1 The principle was first judicially recognized in Britain in
160342 and has been part of American common law since the
founding of the nation.43 The federal government codified the rule in
1917, and a majority of states, including Georgia, have done so as
well.44 Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized the knock-and-
announce principle as a "command" of the Fourth Amendment. 45 The
long history and prevalence of the knock-and-announce doctrine
should illustrate how much society values it. 46 Although the common
law did not require announcement in all circumstances, 47 it may
nonetheless be surprising to learn just how easily the police can burst
into a home unannounced.48
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 589.
41. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995) (citing Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313
(1958)).
42. Josephson, supra note 31, at 1235 (citing Semayne's Case, (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195-96
(K.B.)). In Wilson v. Arkansas, Justice Thomas suggests that the rule may actually go back much further,
originating from a statute enacted in 1275. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 932 n.2.
43. Josephson, supra note 31, at 1237-38.
44. Id. at 1239. The federal knock-and-announce requirement is codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2006);
Georgia's may be found in GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-27 (2008).
45. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 589 (citing Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934). The court in Wilson held that the
knock-and-announce principle is "an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment." Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934. The court also noted that the announcement requirement is not a
"rigid rule... that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests." Id.
46. E.g., Uholik, supra note 31, at 292.
47. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 935.
48. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 589-90 (holding that even if the police violated the knock-and-
announce requirement, evidence gathered in the subsequent search is admissible in court); see also
Josephson, supra note 31, at 1262-63. See generally Uholik, supra note 31, at 291.
[Vol. 26:2
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To illustrate, in Hudson v. Michigan, Justice Scalia, speaking for
the Court, succinctly described the flexibility and vagueness of the
knock-and-announce requirement:
[There are] many situations in which it is not necessary to knock
and announce. It is not necessary when 'circumstances presen[t]
a threat of physical violence,' or if there is 'reason to believe that
evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice was
given,' 49 or if knocking and announcing would be 'futile.' 50 We
require only that police 'have a reasonable suspicion.., under
the particular circumstances' that one of these grounds for failing
to knock and announce exists, and we have acknowledged that
'[t]his showing is not high.' 5'
The Court in Hudson held that even if police unlawfully fail to
announce themselves, the evidence seized in the ensuing search need
not be suppressed at trial because evidence concealment is not one of
the interests protected by the knock-and-announce rule.52 Thus, the
Court "destroy[ed] the strongest legal incentive to comply with the
Constitution's knock-and-announce requirement."
53
In Georgia, the knock-and-announce statute mandates that an
officer give "verbal notice or an attempt in good faith to give verbal
notice" before breaking down the door.54 However, "a warrant can
authorize a 'no-knock' entry where police . . . demonstrate 'a
reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence...
would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective
investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction
of the evidence.' ' 55 In line with Hudson, this showing is "not high":
56
49. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 589 (alteration in original) (quoting Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936).
50. Id. at 589-90 (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997)).
51. Id. at 590 (alteration in original) (quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 394).
52. Id. at 594.
53. Id. at 605 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
54. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-27 (2008).
55. Jackson v. State, 634 S.E.2d 846, 848 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting State v. Williams, 621
S.E.2d 581, 583 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)).
56. Poole v. State, 596 S.E.2d 420, 424 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 590).
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To establish reasonable grounds [for a no-knock warrant], the
officer does not have to show specific information that would
lead officers to conclude that they would be harmed if they
announced their authority and purpose; it is sufficient if the
information... would lead to the reasonable conclusion that the
officers could be harmed.... .
For example, in Hunter v. State, a no-knock warrant was authorized
where an informant told officers that automatic weapons may be
found in the house. 58 In State v. Cochran, a no-knock warrant was
authorized based on an informant's assertion that Cochran carried
firearms and "will not go down without a fight.",59 Moreover, even
absent a no-knock warrant, an unannounced entry would still be
justified by the presence of exigent circumstances, defined as
"'reasonable grounds to believe that forewarning would either greatly
increase [officers'] peril or lead to the immediate destruction of the
evidence.' 60  Thus, police violations of the knock-and-announce
principle are only part of the danger because it is relatively easy for
- 61officers to legally dispense with this requirement.
57. Cook v. State, 565 S.E.2d 896, 898 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); see also State v. Cochran, 620 S.E.2d
444,447 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
58. Hunter v. State, 400 S.E.2d 641,644 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
59. Cochran, 620 S.E.2d at 447. But see Poole, 596 S.E.2d at 423-24 (finding no exigent
circumstances justifying a no-knock entry where police decided to break into the house unannounced
after a person inside the residence looked out the window and went back inside).
60. Poole, 596 S.E.2d at 422 (quoting State v. Smith, 467 S.E.2d 221, 222 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)); see
also Martin v. State, 302 S.E.2d 614, 615 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983); Scull v. State, 178 S.E.2d 720, 722 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1970).
61. BALKO, supra note 16, at 5, 30, 31. Balko argues that the knock-and-announce requirement is
"commonly either circumvented through court-sanctioned loop-holes, ignored completely with little
consequence, or only ceremoniously observed, with a knock and announcement unlikely to be noticed
by anyone inside." Id. at 5. In 2008, Georgia Senate passed a bill that would have made it tougher for
police to get no-knock search warrants. Jim Galloway & Bob Kemper, Political Insider, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Mar. 11, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 5381369. However, the bill never made it past the
House and into law. See SB 259, as passed Senate, 2008 Ga. Gen. Assem., available at
http://www.legis.ga.govlegis/2007_08/fultext/sb259.htm. It is unclear how such legislation would
affect warrantless no-knock entries made due to "exigent circumstances." See supra text accompanying
note 60.
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B. Defending Your Home in Georgia
The Georgia defense of habitation statute, found in section 16-3-23
of the Georgia Code, allows persons to use deadly force in defending
their homes against intruders:
62
A person is justified in threatening or using force against another
when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that
such threat or force is necessary to prevent or terminate such
other's unlawful entry into or attack upon a habitation; however,
such person is justified in the use of force which is intended or
likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if:
(1) The entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous
manner and he or she reasonably believes that the entry is
attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or offering
personal violence to any person dwelling or being therein and
that such force is necessary to prevent the assault or offer of
personal violence;
(2) That force is used against another person who is not a
member of the family or household and who unlawfully and
forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the
residence and the person using such force knew or had reason to
believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred; or
(3) The person using such force reasonably believes that the
entry is made or attempted for the purpose of committing a
felony therein and that such force is necessary to prevent the
commission of the felony.63
Whoever uses deadly force under this statute is immune from
prosecution. 64 So is defense of habitation the only way to justify
killing an intruder?
62. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-23 (2007).
63. Id. Subsection (2) of the statute, referred to as the "Make My Day Bill," was added in 2001.
Empie, supra note 21, at 25, 28-29. For discussion of the amendment, see infra Part II.A.3.
64. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-24.2 (2007); Fair v. State, 664 S.E.2d 227, 230 (Ga. 2008) (citing Boggs
v. State, 581 S.E.2d 722, 723 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)) (holding that immunity is determined as a matter of
law before the start of the trial). Section 16-3-24.2 provides:
20101
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Actually, two other similar statutes may grant immunity to
occupants who use deadly force against intruders. 65 Section 16-3-24
66addresses the defense of property other than habitation, and section
16-3-21 addresses general self-defense. 6 7 However, the defense of
habitation statute, section 16-3-23, provides broader protection than
the other immunity statutes. This is partly because subsection (2) of
section 16-3-23 "may not require the defender of habitation to have
an objectively reasonable belief' that the use of force is necessary.69
Moreover, the defense of habitation statute may justify the use of
deadly force "even if that amount of force was not necessarily
required to repel [an] attack.",70 Thus, in any case where a defendant
is accused of shooting a police officer during a raid, it is crucial to
plead defense of habitation under section 16-3-23.71
A person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code Section 16-3-21, 16-3-23,
16-3-23.1, or 16-3-24 shall be immune from criminal prosecution therefor unless in the
use of deadly force, such person utilizes a weapon the carrying or possession of which is
unlawful by such person under Part 2 or 3 of Article 4 of Chapter II of this title.
65. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21, -24, -24.2 (2007); Rutlege, supra note 2 1, at 630-33.
66. Section 16-3-24(b) provides:
The use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to
prevent trespass on or other tortious or criminal interference with real property other than
a habitation or personal property is not justified unless the person using such force
reasonably believes that it is necessary to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.
67. Section 16-3-21(a) provides:
A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent
that he or she reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to defend himself
or herself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful force; however,
except as provided in Code Section 16-3-23, a person is justified in using force which is
intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he or she reasonably
believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or
herself or a third person or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.
68. Rutlege, supra note 21, at 631.
69. Id.
70. Benham v. State, 591 S.E.2d 824, 826 (Ga. 2004). Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-23 (2007),
with § 16-3-2 1. But see Patel v. State, 620 S.E.2d 343, 348 (Ga. 2005) (Carley, J., concurring) ("Benham
should be cautiously and sensibly limited to its actual holding by the express terms of [section] 16-3-
23 ....").
71. See Benham, 591 S.E.2d at 826 (finding ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to plead
immunity under the defense of habitation statute). All the immunity statutes described above allow the
defendant to avoid trial altogether, thereby conferring "a far greater right than any encompassed by an
affirmative defense." Bunn v. State, 667 S.E.2d 605, 608 (Ga. 2008). To avoid trial, the defendant must
prove immunity by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Failing that, the defendant may still assert an
affirmative defense at trial based on the immunity statutes. Id. In that case, the prosecution must
disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
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II. ANALYSIS: EXPLORING THE STATUTE AND
SURROUNDING CASE LAW
The main paragraph of section 16-3-23 states that persons may use
deadly force if they reasonably believe that it is necessary to prevent
an "unlawful entry into or attack upon a habitation." 72 The first issue
in applying the statute is to determine whether the entry or attack on a
habitation must actually be unlawful, or if instead the occupant must
only reasonably believe that the entry or attack is unlawful.73 After
all, if the entry must actually be unlawful, then a home occupant who
shoots an officer during a raid would not be able to plead defense of
habitation as long as the officer had a warrant and otherwise
complied with the law.74 Second, it is helpful to see how Georgia
courts have historically dealt with deadly confrontations between
police and citizens, and whether officers enjoyed any special
protection under the law.75 Finally, this Part will explore some
Georgia cases that have actually applied the defense of habitation
statute to police-civilian encounters.76
72. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-23 (2007) (emphasis added).
73. Many no-knock raids that result in unnecessary deaths are lawfully (though not necessarily
prudently) carried out by police. See BALKO, supra note 16, at 71-79. For an example of a recent
Georgia case, see Fair v. State, 664 S.E.2d 227, 233-37 (Ga. 2008) (finding that the warrant, manner of
entry, and search of the house were valid where the defendants shot and killed an officer thinking they
were being attacked). In his treatise on Georgia criminal offenses and defenses, Robert Cleary states that
"[flor the defense of habitation to be applicable, it is essential that the entry defended against be
unlawful." ROBERT E. CLEARY, JR., DI 7 KURTZ CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND DEFENSES IN GEORGIA, at IV
(2008). However, the cases Cleary cites for this proposition are not so clear-cut. See id. at n.34. The two
most relevant cases cited are Leach v. State, 239 S.E.2d 177 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) and Washington v.
State, 263 S.E.2d 152 (Ga. 1980). CLEARY, supra, at nn.35-36. These two cases are discussed in detail
infra Part B.C.
74. See, e.g., State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 576 (Utah 1991). The court in Gardiner concluded, in
dicta, that "the legislature intended [the defense of habitation statute] to exclude peace officers acting in
the course of their duties." Id. The court actually held that the defense of habitation statute did not apply
because the place allegedly defended was not a habitation. Id. at 575. Utah's defense of habitation
statute is similar to Georgia's. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-405 (2004), with GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-23 (2007).
75. See discussion infra Part II.B.
76. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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A. Letter and Spirit of the Law
The actual language of the statute is the most important factor in its
interpretation. 77 In decoding section 16-3-23, this Note explores the
wording of the text, cases that have interpreted the language, and
legislative history.
7 8
1. Breaking Down the Text
First, it is important to look at the common-sense grammatical
structure of the text.79 Looking at the statute, one can ask what
justifies the use of force? The answer is "reasonable belief that
.... ,80 Logically, reasonable belief qualifies the rest of the sentence
after the word that.8 1 If so, then reasonable belief also qualifies
unlawful entry, allowing a person to use force merely on reasonable
belief that the entry is unlawful.82 But even if unlawful entry is not
qualified by reasonable belief, it is possible that the second clause,
after the first semi-colon ("however, such person is justified in the
use of [deadly] force . . . only if. . .,,83), is a completely separate
statement explaining when someone can use deadly force-a
statement that is unqualified by the previous clause dealing with the
use of non-deadly physical force. 84 Although the addition of the word
only to the second clause makes it more restrictive, the restriction
77. LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
PROBLEMS, THEORIES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 7, 8 (2006); see also NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D.
SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:1 (7th ed. 2008)
(discussing the plain meaning rule).
78. See generally SINGER & SINGER, supra note 77, § 45 (discussing criteria for statutory
interpretation). There are other ways to interpret a statute, such as by reference to statutes on other
subjects, id. § 53, or similar statutes of other states, id. § 52, but such broad and comprehensive analysis
is beyond the purview of this note.
79. See id. § 47:1 (discussing textual construction of statutes). However, "[a] legislature is not
compelled by any superior force to obey the rules of grammar and composition." Id.
80. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-23 (2007).
81. Interview with Doug Ramseur, Senior Staff Attorney, Office of the Ga. Capital Defender,
Atlanta, Ga. (Oct. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Ramseur Interview].
82. Id.
83. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-23 (2007) (emphasis added).
84. Id.; see also Ramseur Interview, supra note 81.
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may come from other conditions, other than unlawfulness, that are
described in subsections (1), (2), and (3).85
Next, it helps to look at some of the rules of statutory
construction. 86 According to the rule of surplusage, "[i]t is a 'cardinal
principle . . . ' that 'a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so
construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word
shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant."' 87 Thus, in subsection
(2), the word unlawfully was probably used for a purpose and must be
contrasted with subsections (1) and (3), where the word unlawful was
not used.88 Moreover, "where the legislature has employed a term in
one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where
excluded., 89 Thus, the word unlawful should not be implied in
subsections (1) and (3), where it seems to have been left out
purposefully. 90 If the legislature intended to require unlawful entry, it
"knew how to do so." 91 In the words of the Georgia Supreme Court,
"[w]e must presume that [the legislature's] failure to do so was a
matter of considered choice."
92
Due to the ambiguity of the language, the rule of lenity may also
apply.93 The rule developed from an "instinctive distaste against men
languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said that they
should.",94 Thus, a court may interpret the statute in favor of the
85. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-23(1-3) (2007); see also Ramseur Interview, supra note 81.
86. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 77, § 47:1 (describing the role of the actual text in statutory
interpretation).
87. JELLUM & HRICI., supra note 77, at 147 (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001));
see also SINGER & SINGER, supra note 77, § 46:6 (discussing how each word in a statute is given effect).
88. See generally SINGER& SINGER, supra note 77, § 46:6.
89. Id.
90. Seegenerallyid.
91. Fair v. State, 664 S.E.2d 227, 232 (Ga. 2008) (quoting Inland Paperboard & Packaging v. Ga.
Dep't of Revenue, 616 S.E.2d 873, 876 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)). In all fairness, one can argue that, because
subsection (2) was added after the rest of the statute, it is possible that the legislature, in enacting the
original statute, intended the word "unlawful" in the first section to qualify "entry" in both original
subsections. See generally id. (stating that the history of a statute belied the legislature's intent to include
or omit a provision). However, that would imply careless oversight on the legislature's part in enacting
subsection (2). See generally SINGER & SINGER, supra note 77, § 46:6.
92. Fair, 664 S.E.2d at 232 (quoting Inland Paperboard & Packaging, 616 S.E.2d at 876).
93. JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 77, at 386. The rule of lenity generally holds that a person should
not be punished for a crime that "a reasonable person could not know was illegal." Id
94. Dixon v. State, 596 S.E.2d 147, 150 (Ga. 2004) (quoting United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291,
305 (1992)); see also JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 77, at 386 (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 407
20101
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defendant and not require actual unlawful entry.95 However, courts
usually apply the rule of lenity only when all other sources of
statutory interpretation have been exhausted.96 One cannot be certain
that a court will find sufficient ambiguity in the defense of habitation
statute to resort to this rule.
2. Answers from the Bench
The Georgia Supreme Court in Hammock v. State, armed with two
rules of statutory construction, attempted to decipher the statute.97 In
Hammock, the defendant, seeking shelter from her husband, locked
herself in the bedroom.98 When the husband broke down the door and
advanced on the defendant to "teach her a lesson," she shot him in the
chest, killing him.99 The court reasoned that because subsections (1)
and (3) of section 16-3-23 did not mention members of the same
household, unlike subsection (2), then "the lack of limiting language
in subsections (1) and (3) shows the legislature's intent to allow these
subsections to apply between co-inhabitants."' 0° The same can be
said for the word "unlawful": its absence in subsections (1) and (3)
shows that the legislature did not intend for unlawfulness to be
F.3d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 2005)). Note, however, that the question of unlawfulness does not address the
conduct of the actor, but rather the status of the potential victim. See discussion infra Part III.A. So if the
statute were to be interpreted as requiring actual unlawful entry, the guilt or innocence of the occupant
would depend not on the actor's subjective conduct, but on the status of the intruder. See discussion
infra Part lI.A.
95. Fleet Fin., Inc. of Ga. v. Jones, 430 S.E.2d 352, 355 (Ga. 1993) ("[A criminal statute] must be
construed strictly against criminal liability and, if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation, the interpretation most favorable to the party facing criminal liability must be adopted.");
see JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 77, at 386.
96. United States v. Staples, 511 U.S. 600, 619 n.17 (1994) ("[The rule of lenity] 'is reserved for
cases where, after seizing every thing from which aid can be derived,' the Court is 'left with an
ambiguous statute."' (citations omitted)); JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 77, at 386.
97. Hammock v. State, 592 S.E.2d 415, 418 (Ga. 2004). The court applied two principles of statutory
interpretation: "expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one thing implies exclusion of
another) and expressum facit cessare taciturn (if some things are expressly mentioned, the inference is
stronger that those not mentioned were intended to be excluded)." Id.
98. Id. at 417.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 418-19. See generally JELLUM & HRiCIK, supra note 77, at 165-67; SINGER & SINGER,
supra note 77, § 47:23 (discussing the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius).
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relevant to these subsections. 10 1 But in a strange twist, the Hammock
court held that defense of habitation did not apply because the
bedroom was not a habitation-the defendant had no right to exclude
her husband from the room.'0 2 Thus, the husband's breaking down
the door was "not an unlawful entry into or attack upon Hammock's
habitation."'0 3 It is unclear whether Hammock knew if her husband's
entry was lawful or not, or whether such knowledge figured into the
court's decision.' 0
4
In Robison v. State, another interesting case interpreting the statute,
the defendant came into his brother's house and attacked him with a
meat cleaver, at which point the brother beat the defendant with a
pool cue. 10 5 Convicted of aggravated assault, the defendant asserted
that he was only trying to defend himself against the victim's
"unjustified attack."' 0 6 The defendant argued that section 16-3-23
"forbade the victim from using deadly force because he is the victim's
brother."' 1 7 The court disagreed, explaining that "subsection (2)[,] ...
which excludes family members from its scope, applies only to
defense against one 'who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has
unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence. "'108 The court cited
subsection (1), which does not exclude family members, and held that
subsection (2) was inapplicable to this case. 10 9 The court's holding
implies that, even though subsection (2) may be inapplicable against
an intruder who enters lawfully, subsections (1) and (3) would still
apply because, such as with family members, those subsections say
nothing about unlawfulness of entry."l0
101. See Hammock, 592 S.E.2d at 418-19; see also JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 77, at 165-67;
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 77, § 47:23.
102. Hammock, 592 S.E.2d at 419.
103. Id.
104. Seeid.
105. Robison v. State, 625 S.E.2d 533, 535 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 536.
108. Id. (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-23(2) (2007)).
109. Id.
110. See id at 536. But see Fannin v. State, 299 S.E.2d 72, 73 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that
defense of habitation applies because the "evidence ... clearly shows that the deceased used coercion
and threats to gain entry into the defendant's home").
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To take a lesson from history, an old Georgia case strongly
suggests that the defendant's reasonable belief, rather than the
lawfulness or unlawfulness of the victim's entry, is all that should
matter."' In McPherson v. State, the defendant shot a man on his
property because he thought the man was a burglar. It turned out,
however, that the defendant's wife had allowed the man onto the
property.112 The court, in examining the defendant's conduct,
reasoned that "[a] man cannot in general, be held accountable as a
criminal for failing to govern himself by something of the existence
of which he is ignorant."" 3 Further, the court noted that if the
defendant actually believed that the man was a burglar, and the
circumstances justified such a belief, then the case would not have
been "materially different from what it would have been, if [the man]
had really been a burglar." 114 McPherson directly implies that if a
homeowner shoots at a robber who turns out to be a police officer, a
court should treat the situation no differently than if the victim had
actually been a robber.
3. Lawmakers' Goal
Having analyzed the text, it is helpful to look at what the
legislature intended to accomplish by enacting the statute, or at least a
part thereof. 1 5 The Georgia legislature amended the defense of
habitation statute in 2001 by adding subsection (2), suggesting a
broader, occupant-oriented interpretation. 1 6 The "Make My Day
Bill," as the proposed amendment was called, was designed to allow
homeowners to "shoot first and ask questions later.""' 7 Thus,
subsection (2) would "allow people to defend their home without
having to stop and think whether deadly force toward an intruder
would meet the prior two [(subsections (1) and (3))] reasonableness
111. McPherson v. State, 22 Ga. 478 (1857), available at 1857 WL 1938.
112. Id. at *2.
113. Id. at *7.
114. Id. at *8.
115. See generally SINGER & SINGER, supra note 77, § 48.1 (describing the use of legislative history
in statutory interpretation).
116. See Empie, supra note 21, at 25-29.
117. Id. at25.
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requirements."' 1 8 As Senator Eric Johnson, Senate District No. 1,
said, the bill's purpose is "to allow homeowners to protect
themselves and their property when they know or reasonably know
that someone has trespassed into their home."' 19 Yet if the entry must
actually be unlawful, the occupant would be required to engage in a
careful risk-benefit analysis before shooting at perceived intruders.
120
On one hand, if the occupant does not react soon enough, she risks
being murdered or raped, 121 but if she acts too quickly, she risks
being convicted of a major felony. 122 It seems, therefore, that the
legislature wanted to enable home dwellers to act simply on
reasonable belief in shooting at intruders, and interpreting the statute
otherwise would conflict with legislative intent.
123
B. Resisting Arrest in the Good Old Days
124
In interpreting the statute, it is helpful to look briefly at Georgia's
common law principles, especially in situations of conflict between
citizens and police. 125 A number of Georgia cases have dealt with
situations where a civilian used deadly force against police while
118. Id. at 26.
119. Id. at 26-27 (emphasis added) (quoting Telephone Interview with Sen. Eric Johnson, Senate
District No. 1 (Apr. 3, 2001)). This comment was made to stress that the bill was not intended to allow
family members to shoot one another. Id. One may infer that the unlawfulness language in subsection (2)
was designed specifically to prevent hostile family shoot-outs and not to impose external restrictions on
the occupant's reasonable belief that a robber has broken into the home. See id
120. See BALKO, supra note 16, at 35-36.
121. See discussion infra Part llI.B.
122. See discussion infra Part II.A.
123. See Empie, supra note 21, at 26.
124. For a thorough examination of the common law rule granting a citizen the right to forcefully
resist an illegal arrest, see State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 571-75 (Utah 1991).
125. See generally SINGER & SINGER 2B, supra note 77, § 50:2 (discussing application of statutes with
reference to common law principles). The authors note that "common-law principles have frequently
been invoked as the basis to insist on criminal intent as an element of crimes under statutes which failed
specifically to require it." Id.
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resisting arrest.' 26 Notably, courts do not necessarily give police any
broader protection than ordinary citizens. 
127
In Davis v. State, a deputy officer came to the defendant's house to
arrest him. 128 The deputy had a warrant but did not inform the
defendant of the warrant or his intent to arrest. 129 The defendant
resisted, ran "around his house" into the back door, and finally shot
the officer after the latter "attempt[ed] to enter with a pistol in his
hand."' 130 The court held that the defendant had a right to resist the
officer because he did not know of the officer's status or intent to
arrest, "and if [the officer] had died from the wounds inflicted by the
defendant.. . , it would not have been murder."'
' 31
One frequently cited holding comes from Norton v. State.132 In
Norton, the defendant police officer, after a pursuit, shot a man when
the latter refused to hold up his hands and "brought his hand forward
with something in it."'1 33 In part of its holding, the court elaborated on
the right to resist arrest:
The mere fact of an unlawful arrest will not alone authorize the
killing of the officer making it. But if... the officer is about to
commit a felony upon the other party, or so acts and makes such
126. See, e.g., Mullis v. State, 27 S.E.2d 91 (Ga. 1943); Shafer v. State, 20 S.E.2d 34 (Ga. 1942);
McBride v. State, 199 S.E. 153 (Ga. 1938); Paramore v. State, 129 S.E. 772 (Ga. 1925); Davis v. State,
4 S.E. 318 (Ga. 1887). Although these cases are fairly old, none of them has been overruled.
127. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 169 S.E. 315, 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 1933) (holding that a citizen has a
right to resist unlawful arrest "force with force... and if... he kills an officer or private citizen who
joins in an attempt to effect illegal arrest... he is guilty of no offense").
128. Davis v. State, 4 S.E. 318, 318 (Ga. 1887).
129. Id.
130. Id. (reversing the lower court's conviction for "assault with intent to murder"). However, the
court implied that if the defendant actually killed the officer, he would still be guilty of manslaughter,
but not murder. See id.
131. Id. at 319. The court, in dictum, doubted whether the officer in question had the right to effect
the arrest. Id. at 318.
132. Norton v. State, 74 S.E. 759, 760 (Ga. 1912). For other cases that cite the holding, see, for
example, Mullis v. State, 27 S.E.2d 91, 98-99 (Ga. 1943), Shafer v. State, 20 S.E.2d 34, 39 (Ga. 1942),
McBride v. State, 199 S.E. 153, 156 (Ga. 1938), and Paramore v. State, 129 S.E. 772, 777 (Ga. 1925).
133. Norton, 74 S.E. at 761. But see Gresham v. State, 27 S.E.2d 463, 464 (Ga. Ct. App. 1943)
("[I]f... the facts and circumstances surrounding the accused at the time he killed the deceased, were
such only as would excite the fears of a reasonable man that some bodily harm, less than a felony, was
imminent and impending, this would not be a defense to voluntary manslaughter .... (emphasis
added)).
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a show of violence as to excite in the person sought to be arrested
the fears of a reasonable man that a felony is about to be
committed upon him, and such person acts under the influence of
those fears, and not in a spirit of revenge, he may protect
himself, although it may be necessary to slay the officer for that
purpose.
134
The court noted that the defendant officer in question "did not even
inform the person whom he shot of his official position."'
135
Mullis v. State is another illustrative case that expounds upon the
"reasonable fears" doctrine quoted above.' 36 In Mullis, the defendant
stabbed a police officer in the jugular vein with a pocket knife after
the officer beat the defendant on the head in an effort to arrest him.'
37
The trial judge charged the jury that "a person may kill to prevent an
illegal arrest only when it is reasonably and absolutely necessary."'
138
On appeal, the court held that such a charge was error because this
instruction "wholly eliminated the principle of 'reasonable fears' of a
felonious assault by the deceased, a resistance to which would
constitute justifiable homicide.' ' 139 The court stated that when an
officer tries to make a lawful arrest but in a felonious manner, "or if
134. Norton, 74 S.E. at 760 (emphasis added). The court's holding stems from the trial court's jury
charge that if the defendant acted in self-defense "against one who manifestly intended by violence or
surprise to commit a felony on his person," the homicide would be justified. Id. The holding, affirming
the defendant's conviction, implies that the victim could not have manifestly intended to commit a
felony on the officer because he was lawfully resisting an illegal arrest. Id.
135. Id.
136. Mullis v. State, 27 S.E.2d 91, 98, 100 (Ga. 1943) (citing Ga. Code of 1933 §§ 26-1011, 26-
1012). The doctrine of reasonable fears was codified in the two cited sections of the Georgia 1933 Code.
See id. Section 26-1011, covering justifiable homicide, self defense, and defense of habitation, states
that one is justified in committing homicide "against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by
violence or surprise, to commit a felony.., or against any persons who manifestly intend and endeavor,
in a riotous and tumultuous manner, to enter the habitation of another for the purpose of assaulting or
offering personal violence"; section 26-1012 states that "a bare fear of any of those offenses. . . shall not
be sufficient to justify the killing. It must appear that the circumstances were sufficient to excite the
fears of a reasonable man .... " Ga. Code of 1933 §§ 26-1011, 26-1012 (1935) (emphasis added). For
more recent cases applying the doctrine, see Andrews v. State, 480 S.E.2d 29, 30 (Ga. 1997) and
Crawford v. State, 480 S.E.2d 573, 575 (Ga. 1997). Notably, "[t]he fears of a reasonable man don't
mean the fears of a coward, but of a man reasonably courageous, reasonably self-possessed." Johnson v.
State, 72 Ga. 679, at *8 (1884), available at 1884 WL 2207.
137. Mullis, 27 S.E.2d at 94-96.
138. Id. at96.
139. Seeid at 100.
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the circumstances are sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable
man that such a felony is intended, and the offender slays the
officer.., to protect himself from what is or what reasonably
appears to be such a felonious assault, then.., the killing would be
justifiable."'140
According to Mullis, then, even during a legal arrest, if the
officer's manner of arrest reasonably appears to be felonious, the
defendant would be justified in killing him.' 41
It is uncertain whether one can justify killing a police officer in a
no-knock raid on the grounds of resisting arrest. Perhaps because few
perfectly legal arrests appear to be felonious, lethal resistance is
justified mostly in situations where the arrest (or manner thereof) is
actually unlawful. 142 Moreover, in a vast majority of cases, the
defendants know that they are resisting police. 143 But all in all, the
law seems to balance the risk of committing a felony almost equally
between an officer and a citizen in dubious encounters. 144 As the
court in Dixon v. State said, "the arresting officer is charged with the
duty of acting in conformity with the law, and acts at his peril if he
violates it; and, likewise, the law having enjoined that the citizen
quietly submit to lawful arrest, his adjudication that the arrest is
unlawful is made at his peril.'
145
140. Id. at 98 (citing Ga. Code of 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012). The court also cited Norton for the
"reasonable fears" proposition quoted in the preceding paragraph. Id. at 99. The same "reasonable fears"
standard applies to police officers who shoot at citizens. Gordy v. State, 92 S.E.2d 737, 739 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1956) (holding that a police officer would be justified in killing a person whom he lawfully sought
to arrest "under the fears of a reasonable man that a felony was about to be committed upon himself or a
fellow officer").
141. See Mullis, 27 S.E.2d at 98. The defendant in Mullis knew that the person he killed was a police
officer. Id. at 94-96; see also Paramore v. State, 129 S.E. 772, 777 (Ga. 1925) (holding that the
defendant may have been justified in killing an officer when the latter lawfully tried to arrest the
defendant for a misdemeanor but then unlawfully shot at the defendant when he tried to run away). But
see Glaze v. State, 120 S.E. 530, 533 (Ga. 1923) ("If a person kill [sic] an officer to prevent the latter
from lawfully arresting him in a lawful way, the crime is murder."); Brown v. State, 69 S.E. 45, 48 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1910) (holding that mere menacing and threatening language or surroundings can only mitigate
a killing from murder to manslaughter, but if the victim-a town marshal, in this case--had a "pointed
pistol ... coupled with the statement 'God dani you, I will kill you,"' the killing would be justifiable).
142. See, e.g., Mullis, 27 S.E.2d at 99-100; Paramore, 129 S.E. at 777.
143. See, e.g., Glaze, 120 S.E. at 533; Perano v. State, 307 S.E.2d 64, 66 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
144. See Dixon v. State, 76 S.E. 794, 794-95 (Ga. Ct. App. 1912).
145. Id.
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C. Defense of Habitation Applied
There is very little Georgia case law addressing what happens
when a home dweller shoots at police during a no-knock raid and
kills an officer. 146 However, there are some cases where the
defendant, after attacking police, tried to assert defense of
habitation. 147 These cases, described below, offer a glimpse into the
courts' potential approach to the problem and may be cited for
precedent when the no-knock raid issue comes to the forefront.
In Leach v. State, a police officer came to the defendant's house in
response to a "wife beating incident." 148 Before the officer came in,
the defendant took a sawed-off shotgun, pointed it at the officer, and
said "I'm going to kill you." 149 The officer retreated, and the
defendant was charged with aggravated assault. 150 In response to the
defendant's defense of habitation claim, the court held that "there
was sufficient evidence for the jury to find either that the officer did
not make an unlawful entry or was not attempting to make one." 151 It
is not clear whether the court stressed the lack of an entry, or the lack
of an unlawful entry.1
5 2
146. However, there may be a ruling on the matter in the near future. In Fair v. State, the defendants
were charged with murdering a police officer during the exercise of a no-knock warrant. Fair v. State,
664 S.E.2d 227, 229-30 (Ga. 2008). The defendants asserted immunity based on GA. CODE ANN. § 16-
3-23, § 16-3-24, and § 16-3-24.2 (2007). Fair, 664 S.E.2d at 230. The court remanded the case back for
a pre-trial determination of whether the defendants should be immune from prosecution. Id
147. See discussion infra Part H.C.
148. Leach v. State, 239 S.E.2d 177, 178 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977).
149. Id. at 179.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 180.
152. See id In denying the defense of habitation, it is often unclear whether courts stress the victim's
lack of entry or lawfulness thereof. For example, in Stobbart v. State, the defendant shot a guest after an
argument. Stobbart v. State, 533 S.E.2d 379, 381 (Ga. 2000). The court held that defense of habitation
did not apply because "[section] 16-3-23 authorizes use of force to terminate an 'unlawful entry into or
attack upon a habitation.' The statute is clearly concerned with the use of deadly force to counter entry,
or attempted entry, into the home." Id. at 383. The court further noted that the defense is unavailable
"when the victim is a guest in the home." Id.; see also Lee v. State, 415 S.E.2d 290, 293 (Ga. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that defense of habitation did not apply where the defendant invited the victim into his
home because use of deadly force is justified when the occupant "reasonably believes that the entry is
made or attempted for the purpose of committing a felony therein"); Terrell v. Hester, 355 S.E.2d 97, 99
(Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that section 16-3-23 did not apply where the defendant beat the plaintiff-
who may have been lawfully on the premises--outside the house because no entry actually occurred).
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In Price v. State, the defendant was charged with aggravated
assault upon a peace officer because he shot at the police after they
pursued him and broke into his apartment. 153 The defendant asserted
defense of habitation under section 16-3-23.154 First, the court found
that the officers' entry into the apartment was lawful. 155 Next, the
court found that the defendant's shooting may not have been justified
under section 16-3-23, but the court only cited subsections (1) and (3)
(then subsections (1) and (2)) for this lack of justification. 156 The
court held that the defendant's "knowledge of the identity of the
individuals as officers and his justification for firing on them were
issues which were properly submitted to the jury."' 57 The court's
reasoning and holding directly imply that if the defendant did not
know the officers' status, and if he was justified in shooting at them
under subsections (1) and (3), then the actual lawfulness or
unlawfulness of the officers' entry would be irrelevant.'
1 58
A Georgia Supreme Court case, Washington v. State, cites both
Davis159 and Norton160  and provides some illumination. of the
issue.161 In Washington, the defendant threatened to "blow the
policeman's brains out" after the officers drove up to his house in
response to a call. 162 After hearing more obscenities and threats, the
police pursued the defendant into the house, where he shot and killed
one of the officers and later bragged about it.163 The court held that
"the suspect cannot withdraw into his house, shoot and kill one of the
153. Price v. State, 334 S.E.2d 711, 715 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
154. Id
155. Id.
156. Id. at 716. Recall that subsections (1) and (3) do not mention unlawfulness of entry. GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-23 (2007); see also supra Part 1I.A.
157. Price, 334 S.E.2d at 716.
158. See id.; but cf Parrish v. State, 355 S.E.2d 682, 685 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the
defense of habitation statute did not apply where the defendant pointed a gun at police officers because
there was "no evidence that defendant was attempting 'to prevent or terminate [the officers'] unlawful
entry into or attack upon a habitation" (alteration in original)). In Parrish, however, the defendant
knowingly threatened the officers when they came upon, but did not enter or attempt to enter, his
marijuana patch. Id. at 683.
159. Davis v. State, 4 S.E. 318 (Ga. 1887); see also discussion supra Part H.B.
160. Norton v. State, 74 S.E. 759 (Ga. 1912); see also discussion supra Part H.B.
161. Washington v. State, 263 S.E.2d 152, 154 (Ga. 1980).
162. Id. at 153.
163. Id
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officers who enters thereafter and then claim self-defense."' 64 The
court cited only subsections (1) and (3) of the defense of habitation
statute for its holding, and did not mention that the entry must
actually be unlawful. 165 The court also distinguished Davis on the
grounds that in Davis, "the defendant did not know that the person
making the arrest was a law enforcement officer."'1 66 Thus,
Washington seems to imply that if the defendant did not know that
the person in his house was a police officer, he might have been
justified in shooting the officer.' 67
Importantly, the above cases deal with rather morally clear-cut
situations where the defendants knew that police were after them and
purposefully, even maliciously, tried to resist the law.' 68 Moreover,
the unlawfulness of the entry was not really the primary issue.
1 69
However, in a scenario where a homeowner mistakenly shoots at
police raiders, reasonably believing them to be robbers, the
unlawfulness of entry is bound to come into focus, and the moral
innocence of the shooter is likely to affect a court's decision.
III. PROPOSAL: BALANCING RISKS, AVOIDING COLLISIONS
Courts should hold that the entry does not need to actually be
unlawful for the defense of habitation statute to apply, especially in
cases of no-knock police raids. The language of the statute is
unclear, 170 but even if it leans towards an actual unlawfulness
requirement, in the words of the United States Supreme Court, this is
not "the end of the matter." 17' As previously described, an actual
164. Id. at 154.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing Davis v. State, 4 S.E. 318 (Ga. 1887)).
167. Washington v. State, 263 S.E.2d 152, 154 (Ga. 1980).
168. See id. at 153; see also Price v. State, 334 S.E.2d 711, 715 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980); Leach v. State,
239 S.E.2d 177, 179 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977).
169. See Washington, 263 S.E.2d at 154; see also Price, 334 S.E.2d at 715; Leach, 239 S.E.2d at 179-
80.
170. See discussion supra Part H.A. 1.
171. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68 (1994) (holding that even though the
statute's "most natural grammatical meaning" disposes of a particular knowledge requirement, such a
requirement must be imposed to avoid "anomalies" and because "some form of scienter is to be implied
in a criminal statute even if not expressed").
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unlawfulness requirement would directly conflict with legislative
intent by forcing occupants, at their peril, to think long and hard
before defending themselves. 72 But the most important reason for
not requiring an unlawful entry, and the focus of the discussion
below, is that such a requirement would place an enormous risk of
injury, prison, or death on those who are the least culpable and the
least prepared. 173 Courts can also effectively mitigate any negative
consequences of allowing occupants to shoot upon reasonable
belief.17
4
A. What You Don 't Know May Kill You
If the entry must actually be unlawful, regardless of the occupant's
reasonable belief, what would happen to a person who mistakenly
shoots and kills an officer? This is literally an issue of life and death.
In Fair v. State, the defendants shot and killed a police officer during
a no-knock raid.175 The state charged the defendants with murder and
sought the death penalty based on the aggravating circumstance that
the victim was a peace officer.1 76 The court held that under Georgia
law, the defendant does not have to know that the person killed was a
police officer to be eligible for the death penalty. 177 Under Fair, it is
scary to imagine what would happen if section 16-3-23 were to
require actual unlawful entry.
Imagine an occupant who wakes up in the dark of night by
thunderous pounding at the door, jumbled shouts, and the crack of
breaking wood. Startled and overcome with fear, she reaches for the
gun kept for protection and shoots at the perceived intruders. 17' As
soon as the bullet leaves the barrel, she has done her deed, but society
is not yet free to judge her action. Her innocence or guilt, life or
172. See discussion supra Part I.A.3.
173. See discussion infra Part LI.A-C.
174. See discussion infra Part llI.D.
175. Fair v. State, 664 S.E.2d 227, 229-30 (Ga. 2008).
176. Id. at 229-31. A jury may impose a death sentence if it finds at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (2008). Killing a police officer is one of those circumstances.
Id.
177. Fair, 664 S.E.2d at 233.
178. A somewhat similar example may be found in Rutlege, supra note 21, at 629-30.
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death, depend not on her but on who is behind the door. If they are
robbers, then her shooting at them is completely justified, and even
laudable. 179 If the intruders are police, then she is the worst criminal
possible in the eyes of the law. 180 After all, as Justice Brennan stated,
the death penalty is reserved only for the "most heinous crimes."' 8 1 It
is strange and chilling to think, therefore, that whether you are a
perfectly law-abiding citizen or the most heinous of criminals
depends on factors completely beyond your control.
182
B. Are They Real or Fake?
Requiring that an entry actually be unlawful will force occupants
to throw down their guns as soon as they see a badge or hear the
word "police!" Yet such immediate surrender will expose many
people to a great risk of harm. Cases of police impersonation are
rampant throughout the country, and brazen criminals sometimes like
to "disarm their victims by pretending to be cops. 183 For example, in
one Pennsylvania case, a serial killer used a police disguise to gain
entry into a woman's home, then raped her and strangled her with a
drape cord. 184 More recently in Alabama, two men kicked in the door
of an apartment claiming to be narcotics agents, hit the occupant in
the head with a gun, then stole her money and prescription
179. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-23 (2007).
180. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2665 (2008) (stating that the death penalty "must be
reserved for the worst of crimes"); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
181. Furman, 408 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring).
182. One may think that other defenses, like self-defense, would be available to such a person.
However, the self-defense statute suffers from the same ambiguity regarding unlawfulness as defense of
habitation and, furthermore, requires the perceived danger to be imminent. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
21(a) (2007) (stating that a person is justified in using force against another's "imminent use of unlawful
force"); see also discussion supra Part I.B.
183. Colleen Long, Police Impersonators Flash a Badge, Fool a Victim, ASSOCIATED PRESS ALERT
(Conn.), July 13, 2008 (quoting Dr. Naftali Bertill, a lead psychologist at the New York Center for
Neuropsychology and Forensic Behavioral Science); see also BALKO, supra note 16, at 20; Kristan
Trugman, Power Lures Police Impersonators, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), Sept. 10, 1999, at Cl, available at
1999 WLNR 412267.
184. Manuel Gamiz Jr., Illinois Inmate Charged in 1979 Killing: Suspected Serial Killer Timothy
Krajcir Raped, Choked Berks County Woman, Police Say, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Jan. 12,
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 675980.
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medications.185 In another case, two Los Angeles ex-policemen were
convicted of committing "home-invasion robberies that were
designed to look like legitimate police searches of homes and
businesses."' 186 And in Georgia, "men posing as police forced their
way into an apartment ... and shot and wounded a thirteen-year-old
girl."'18
7
Corporal Ilana Spellman, the spokeswoman for the Gwinnett
County Police Department, warned the public about police
impersonators. 188  She said that although police sometimes use
unmarked cars and wear plain clothes, "usually we're going to
announce ourselves and allow someone to come to the door before
we're going to breach a doorway."' 189 But in a no-knock entry, how
will a disoriented occupant identify the intruders? In the few seconds
of sheer terror, will she be able to correctly discern the real police
from potentially dangerous impersonators?
C. Sharing the Risk
Pretenders are out there, but most police are real and law-abiding,
and it may seem unfair to allow jittery occupants to kill honest
officers who are simply following their duties. Though police
certainly deserve all the protection the law allows, civilians should
185. Holly Hollman, Alleged Fake Narc Agents Deny Police Version of Story, DECATUR DAILY
(Ala.), June 5, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 10609127.
186. Wendy Thomas Russel, Ferguson Brothers Convicted of Felonies; COURT: LBPD Officer
Found Guilty on Two Counts of Conspiracy and One Firearm Charge, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM
(Cal.), Jan. 31, 2008, at I A, available at 2008 WLNR 1806857.
187. Andria Simmons, Fake Cops Target Hispanics in Nine Robberies, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 9,
2008, at B3, available at 2008 WLNR 12838445.
188. Id
189. Id. (emphasis added). For other recent examples of criminals impersonating police, see John
Annese, Insist That Cops Show ID Cautions Police Commissioner: Home Invasion by Fake Officers
Points Up the Need for Islanders to be Vigilant, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE (N.Y.), Sept. 5, 2008, at
A01, available at 2008 WLNR 16858478; Matt Burgard, Pair of Scam Artists Strikes, HARTFORD
COURANT (Conn.), June 6, 2008, at B3, available at 2008 WLNR 10727089; Amber Craig, Police Say
Burglar Posed as FBI Agent, PRESS-REGISTER (Mobile, Ala.), Oct. 16, 2008, at Al, available at 2008
WLNR 20108044; Hank Dudding & Jody Callahan, Police: Real Cop Nabs 3 Fakes, MEMPHIS COM.
APPEAL (Tenn.), Oct. 10, 2008, at B2, available at 2008 WLNR 19347604; Man Robbed by Bogus
Police Officers in Home Invasion, VENTURA COUNTY STAR (Cal.), Jan. 14, 2010, available at 2010
WLNR 840502; Police Impersonators Break into a House, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Feb. 4, 2010,
at 22, available at 2010 WLNR 2353532.
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not shoulder all the risks of a deadly encounter. 190 After all, police are
significantly more prepared to deal with deadly situations and to
avoid harm than private citizens. 191 For example, a typical SWAT
team is equipped with, among other things, battle fatigues,
bulletproof helmets and vests, gas masks, boot knives, and military
grade assault weapons. 192 Also, officers who conduct raids are
required to undergo at least one hour of training per month. 193
Compare that to a startled civilian with no martial experience and an
old revolver who just woke up or came out of the shower. 194 As
Balko notes, it is unrealistic and unfair to expect civilian occupants to
"show remarkable poise and composure, exercise good judgment, and
hold their fire, even as teams of armed assailants are swarming their
homes."' 95 Police are in much better shape to evaluate and minimize
the risks of breaking into a home unannounced.1
96
D. Life and Justice for All
Allowing homeowners to defend themselves in good faith against
no-knock police raids is the right and reasonable course to take.
197
However, the legislature and the courts may be put off by the
resulting legal collision.' 98 After all, during a no-knock entry, both
the police and home dwellers would be able to legally kill each
other. 199 Legalizing such deadly encounters will not solve the
190. See BALKO, supra note 16, at 35-36.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 5; see also ROBERT SNOW, SWAT TEAMS: EXPLOSIVE FACE-OFFS WITH AMERICA'S
DEADLIEST CRIMINALS 99-121 (1996) (describing weapons and other equipment used by SWAT
teams). But note that "SWAT officials are armed with much more destructive and dangerous equipment
than are regular police officers." Id. at 103.
193. BALKO, supra note 16, at 36.
194. See supra INTRODUCTION; see also United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 33, 39 (2003) (finding
that, after announcing themselves, fifteen to twenty seconds was long enough for police to wait before
entering even though the defendant was in the shower and did not hear the police announce themselves);
BALKO, supra note 16, at 35-36.
195. BALKO, supra note 16, at 36.
196. Id.
197. See discussion supra Part HA-C.
198. See Butler, supra note 22, at 451.
199. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20(b) (2008) (allowing use of deadly force by police "when the
officer reasonably believes that the suspect poses an immediate threat of physical violence to the officer
or others"); Allen v. City of Atlanta, 510 S.E.2d 64, 65-66 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing an officer's
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problem, but our justice system should not blame and punish the
police or private citizens for taking reasonable actions in pursuit of
self-preservation. 2 0 Perhaps, as Balko said, "the fault lies with the
bad public policy that puts police officers in such unnecessarily
perilous situations.' '2° 1 But adequate protection of both police and
citizens can be achieved without eliminating no-knock raids
altogether and without imposing an actual unlawfulness requirement
in section 16-3-23.202
In construing the defense of habitation statute, courts should apply
an objective reasonableness standard in assessing the defending
occupant's apprehension of danger, as is the case with self-
defense.203 The courts should then enunciate the circumstances under
which an occupant's belief that robbers are invading her house is
objectively reasonable.204 Thereby, officers in preparation for a no-
knock raid would bear those circumstances in mind and would do
their best to avoid inciting any reasonable apprehension of danger in
the occupant. And if worse comes to worst, the court will at least
have a clear and fair framework for deciding whether the occupant
was justified in shooting.
To determine whether an occupant had an objectively reasonable
belief that her house was being robbed, courts may find it helpful to
suspension for shooting at an approaching car's driver when the latter failed to stop and drove towards
officer); BALKO, supra note 16, at 35 (describing how even faultless officers will fire back at raid targets
in order to protect their own lives).
200. See BALKO, supra note 16, at 35.
201. Id.
202. But see id. at 26-27 (suggesting that no-knock raids are generally ineffective and do not serve
their ostensible purpose).
203. See Lewis v. State, 515 S.E.2d 382, 383 (Ga. 1999) (holding that in self-defense, the "subjective
fears of a particular defendant are irrelevant"); Nelson v. State, 331 S.E.2d 554, 557 (Ga. 1985) (holding
that when a person asserts self-defense, his actions are governed by a reasonable person standard); Bell
v. Smith, 488 S.E.2d 91, 93 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) ("The question is not whether [the defendant] actually
feared the occupants of the truck, but rather whether an objective reasonable person would have
believed [the person protected] to be in imminent danger."). For Georgia's self-defense statute, see GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-21 (2007).
204. Because the defense of habitation statute allows for immunity from prosecution, the court, not
the jury, will decide whether the circumstances in any given case create an objectively reasonable belief
in the occupant that criminals were invading her home. See Bunn v. State, 667 S.E.2d 605, 608 (Ga.
2008); see also Fair v. State, 664 S.E.2d 227, 230 (Ga. 2008).
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consider several factors. 205 For example, the defendant's general
behavior may be relevant: if the defendant is a previously convicted
felon or is engaged in habitual and serious criminal activity, he may
be more aware of the possibility of a police raid and would be more
likely to knowingly kill an officer than an innocent person.2 °6 Also
important are the time of day and the character of the
neighborhood-if it is nighttime, or if there have been previous home
invasions in the area, the occupants might be more likely to think that
robbers are breaking in.207 Finally, the method of entry should be
carefully examined.20 8 If police use loudspeakers or sirens to alert the
occupant of their presence; if they wear uniforms rather than plain
clothes; and if they enter in an organized rather than a "violent and
tumultuous" 20 9 manner, then the occupant would be less likely to
mistake the police for robbers.
210
Clear guidelines as to what constitutes reasonable belief would
alleviate tensions both in court and in the field. Police would be
encouraged to evaluate more seriously whether the occupant might
reasonably mistake them for robbers, thereby reducing the chance of
a deadly encounter. 211 Furthermore, trigger-happy occupants would
also be kept in check. After all, innocent landlords, deliverymen,
postal workers, and salesmen do not forcefully break into houses at
night.212 And if a shooting does occur, the objective reasonable belief
205. For example, courts consider several factors to determine whether a warrantless, non-consensual
entry is justified. E.g., United States v. Standridge, 810 F.2d 1034, 1037 (11 th Cir. 1987).
206. Cf United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119-20 (2001) (holding that a probationer has a
lesser expectation of privacy, with respect to police searches, than an ordinary citizen). But a criminal
may also be more likely to think that he is being attacked by a rival gang or other criminals. No-Knock
Search Warrants: Weighing Risks vs. Benefits, MACON TEL. (Ga.), Aug. 7, 2007, available at 2007
WLNR 15103314; see also BALKO, supra note 16, at 32.
207. Cf United States v. Magda, 547 F.2d 756, 758 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that, with respect to the
reasonableness of a police stop, "[t]he reputation of an area for criminal activity is an articulable fact
upon which a police officer may legitimately rely").
208. This is not to propose eliminating no-knock entries altogether. Police may sufficiently surprise
the occupant without provoking a deadly reaction by making their presence known during, not before,
entry. A person awakened to the sound of loudspeakers and sirens is not likely to think that robbers are
invading; real criminals would probably not want to announce themselves to the whole neighborhood.
209. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-23(1) (2007).
210. See Simmons, supra note 187; see also Long, supra note 183.
211. See BALKO, supra note 16, at 41-42 (advocating tighter search warrant standards).
212. Cf People v. McNeese, 892 P.2d 304, 311 (Colo. 1995) (saying that Colorado's defense of
habitation statute was not meant to "encourage arbitrary, casual killings").
20101
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standard as to the unlawfulness of the entry would ensure that home
dwellers do not get punished for acting reasonably and that only the
most culpable individuals wind up in prison or on death row.
CONCLUSION
"Innocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright or
embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced police intrusion.
' 213
But the deterioration of the knock-and-announce requirement makes
it easier for law enforcement to lawfully conduct no-knock raids
214
and increases the risk of deadly encounters between police and
citizens.2 15 Like the story of Kathryn Johnston has shown, even law-
abiding civilians may not surrender without a fight when strangers
violently break into their homes. 216 As killings tend to invite criminal
charges, Georgia's defense of habitation statute may offer a critical
legal defense to occupants who use deadly force against police upon
mistaking them for robbers. 217 The key question is whether, under the
statute, the intruder's entry must actually be unlawful, or whether the
occupant may shoot upon reasonable belief that the entry is
unlawful.218
Though the statutory text alone does not provide a clear answer,
2 1 9
instruments of textual interpretation are consistent with the
proposition that the occupant need only reasonably believe that the
entry is unlawful. 220 Further, an exploration of relevant case law
shows that Georgia allows its residents to defend themselves against
reasonably perceived threats, even if those threats appear in a police
213. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 57 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
214. See BALKO, supra note 16, at 30.
215. Butler, supra note 22, at 453.
216. See discussion supra INTRODUCTION.
217. See discussion supra Part LB; see also Balko, supra note 16, at 35 ("[Occupants] who have used
force to defend themselves from improper raids have been prosecuted for criminal recklessness,
manslaughter, and murder and have received sentences ranging from probation, to life in prison, to the
death penalty.").
218. See discussion supra Part I.A.
219. See discussion supra Part B1.A.
220. See discussion supra Part l1.A.1-2.
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uniform.22 1 Finally, with a view to legal precedent, those few cases
that have applied defense of habitation to police encounters are
consistent with exculpating an occupant who has a reasonable
apprehension of danger.
222
Courts should interpret the defense of habitation statute to require
only reasonable belief that the entry is unlawful.223 Otherwise, the
occupant faces a cruel dilemma.224 If he shoots, he risks being
charged with capital murder of a police officer, 225 but if he waits to
ascertain the intruder's identity, he exposes himself to robbers or
police impersonators. 226 Georgia legislature certainly did not intend
for such dreadful hesitation to destroy the protections bestowed by
the statute.227
Requiring only reasonable belief is not likely to endanger officers
or encourage thoughtless shootouts.228 In fact, courts can promote
more police caution and safety by creating clear guidelines as to what
constitutes reasonable belief of danger in an occupant.229 Such
guidelines will encourage officers to consider the reasonable
apprehensions of the occupant before any no-knock raid, thereby
avoiding a mistaken, but deadly reaction.230 And if a tragedy does
occur, such guidelines will ensure that any defendant's punishment is
"tailored to his personal responsibility and moral guilt."
231
221. See discussion supra Part ll.B.
222. See discussion supra Part II.C.
223. See discussion supra Part HI.
224. See discussion supra Part IHL.A-B.
225. See discussion supra Part III.A.
226. See discussion supra Part /I.B.
227. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
228. See discussion supra Part l/I.D.
229. See discussion supra Part lI.D.
230. See discussion supra Part llI.D.
231. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982); see also discussion supra Part III.D.
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